Surrogacy and the Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act: The Need for an Unambiguous Statement by DeMille, Jason C.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 7
5-1-1989
Surrogacy and the Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act:
The Need for an Unambiguous Statement
Jason C. DeMille
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jason C. DeMille, Surrogacy and the Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act: The Need for an Unambiguous Statement, 3 BYU J. Pub. L. 443
(1989).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol3/iss2/7
Surrogacy and the Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act: 
The Need for an Unambiguous Statement 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State legislatures have been slow to respond to the increasingly 
popular1 practice of surrogacy. 2 However, the publicity surrounding 
the Baby M 8 litigation, and Judge Sorkow's decision that surrogate con-
I. A 1985 estimate placed the number of children born to surrogates at around 600 and 
indicated that the numbers appeared to be growing. Gelman & Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by 
Contract, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985, at 74. See also Gest, Finally, A Ruling- 'M' is for Me-
lissa, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Apr. 13, 1987, at 60. One commentator has suggested that 
"[a]s surrogate motherhood comes out into the open and is heavily publicized, it comes to seem a 
more legitimate and more available alternative to people wanting babies." M. FIELD, SuRROGATt: 
MoTHERHOOD, 5 (1988)[hereinafter 'FIELD']. 
2. For example, by early 1985 only 20 states had considered surrogate mother legislation, but 
no legislation was enacted. See Pierce, Suroey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 
II Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001, 3003 (Jan. 29, 1985) [hereinafter 'Pierce']. As of July 1987, no 
state had yet banned the practice. Surrogate Parenthood: Legislative Update, 13 Fam. L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1442 (july 14, 1987) [hereinafter 'Legislative Update']. But cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
509 (1984 ), wherein the Kansas legislature amended its adoption code to provide that the prohibi-
tion against advertising for adoption shall not extend to a prospective surrogate or a person seek-
ing a surrogate. 
For a description of the contemporary practice of surrogacy see infra notes 20-31 and accom-
panying text. 
3. In re Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), rev'd !09 N.J. 
396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
In 1985, William Stern, a naturalized citizen and his family's sole survivor of the Holocaust, 
entered into a surrogate contract with Mary Beth Whitehead. Elizabeth Stern, William's wife, 
suffered from multiple sclerosis, and was unable to have children because she feared bearing a 
child would exacerbate her illness. Mr. Stern was very interested in begetting a child so that his 
family name might be preserved. 
The surrogate contract provided that Mrs. Whitehead would be artificially inseminated, and 
upon conception would carry the child to term, then surrender the child to Mr. Stern. She was 
then required to renounce her parental rights in the child so Mrs. Stern could adopt the child. For 
her efforts, Mrs. Whitehead was to be paid $10,000 plus all of her medical expenses. 
Mrs. Whitehead gave birth to a girl on March 27, 1986, in New Jersey. What happened 
following the birth is by now well known as it turned into a major media event. Mrs. Whitehead 
refused to surrender the child to the Sterns and fled to Florida, where, for three months, she 
evaded attempts by Mr. Stern to obtain custody of the child by living in roughly 20 different 
hotels. Finally, the police found her, and forcibly removed the child from her. 
After a 32 day trial, the trial judge held that the contract was valid and that sole custody 
should be granted to Mr. Stern. Mrs. Stern was allowed to adopt the child. The trial judge found 
that current state laws did not apply to surrogate contracts. The court reasoned that surrogacy was 
constitutionally protected under the right to privacy, and that the agreement could be specifically 
enforced. 
On appeal, Judge Sorkow's decision was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The 
court held the contract invalid because it conflicted with "(I) laws prohibiting the use of money in 
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tracts are specifically enforceable;' has triggered legislative activity 
throughout the nation. 5 The new bills have proposed everything from 
criminalizing surrogacy to codifying the contractual relationship.6 
Other states have established commissions to study the practice. 7 
The Utah Legislature recently became one of the few states to 
adopt legislation prohibiting surrogate motherhood. 8 The Utah Surro-
gate Motherhood Act prohibits both commercial and gratuitous surro-
gacy as violative of public policy, provides criminal punishment for the 
participants of a commercial surrogacy contract, and defines the status 
of children born to surrogates. 
The premise of this comment is that a combination of several stat-
utes may have already prohibited surrogacy before the Utah Surrogate 
Motherhood Act was enacted; nevertheless, the Act is a necessary clari-
fication of the state's policy regarding surrogacy. Unfortunately, the Act 
is automatically repealed in two years, leaving the official policy of the 
state in just as much doubt as it was before the Surrogate Motherhood 
Act was adopted. 
This comment will examine the current practice of surrogate 
connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before 
termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and (3) laws that make surren-
der of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions." Additionally. 
the court held that public policy considerations rendered the contract invalid. The court also held 
that the right to privacy did not include the right to procreate through a surrogate. 
The court granted the Stern's custody of Baby M, who was named Melissa, refused to termi-
nate the parental rights of Mrs. Whitehead or to permit the adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern, 
and remanded the case for a determination of visitation and child-custody. 
4. Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1176 (1987). 
5. Since the trial court's decision in Baby M, at least 64 bills have been introduced in 26 
jurisdictions. Legislative Update, supra note 2. 
6. "The extant bills fall into essentially four categories: those that would codify the sort of 
contractual relationship entered into by Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern to produce 
Baby M; those that would permit surrogacy but render contracts for it unenforceable; those that 
would forbid any payment to the surrogate mother; and those that would outlaw the process 
altogether." 'Baby M' Decision Creates Flurry of Legislative Activity, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 
1295 (Apr. 21, 1987). For a listing of legislative activity regarding surrogacy, see Legislative Up-
date, supra note 2. 
7. /d. In its 1988 session, the Utah Legislature established a Surrogate Parenthood Study 
Committee. See infra note 159. Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas have also set up surro-
gacy study committees. Legislative Update, supra note 2. 
8. The Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act will be codified at UTAH Coot~ ANN. § 76-7-204 
(1989). For a complete discussion of the Utah Act, see infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text. 
To date only three other states have enacted surrogate legislation. Louisiana, Michigan and Ne-
braska have enacted legislation making surrogate contracts unenforceable. See LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:2713 (West Supp. 1988); 1988 Mich. Legis. Serv. 189 (West)(to be codified at MICH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 722.851 (West 1988)); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 25-21,200 (Supp. 1988). 
By judicial decision, the highest courts of Kentucky and New Jersey have also prohibited 
surrogacy agreements. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 
1986); In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987). 
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motherhood (Part II), discuss the principal arguments both for and 
against surrogacy (Part III), determine whether surrogate legislation 
was necessary to prohibit surrogacy in Utah (Part IV) and analyze 
Utah's Surrogate Motherhood Act (Part V). 
II. THE NEED FOR SURROGACY 
Infertility affects a large segment of American society and has dis-
appointed the parental aspirations of millions of American couples.9 In-
fertility creates emotional distress and often creates marital conflict. 10 
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 11 adoption was a 
feasible alternative to childlessness. However, the increased use of con-
traceptives,12 the availability of abortion on demand/3 and the 
destigmatization of unwed or teenage motherhood14 has severely re-
duced the number of adoptable, white, 111 healthy infants. 18 One study 
9. It has been estimated that almost ten percent of married couples in the United States are 
infertile. Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers 
Univ.) I 07 ( 1982). One half of this number is attributable to the wife. New Bedfellows: Freedom 
and Infertility, Sci. Nt:ws, May 31, 1980, at 341 [hereinafter 'Bedfellows']. A 1986 study by the 
American Medical Association estimated that over 6 million American women have difficulty con-
ceiving. Fuchs & Perreault, Expenditures for Reproduction-Related Health Care, 255 J. A.M.A., 
Jan. 3, 1986, at 76, 79. This number becomes more striking when one stops to consider that 
infertility strikes about 14o/o of married women of child bearing age. Mosher & Pratt, National 
Center for Health Statistics: Fecundity and Infertility in the United States, 1965-1982, Vital and 
Health Statistics No. 104, at 5 (Feb. 11, 1985). A couple is considered infertile if the wife fails to 
conceive after having been sexually active, without having used contraception, for a year. ld. at 4. 
Infertility is not just a problem common to women, however. About one-third of couple infer-
tility is attributable to the husband. Bedfellows, at 341. It has been estimated that one in ten men 
are sterile. Immaculate Conceptions, NEW WEST, Aug. 25, 1980, at 28. 
10. Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Nuvel After All, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 
29 (1983) [hereinafter 'Robertson']. 
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
12. The right of an individual to use contraception is well established. See Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. lnt'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
13. It is estimated that the annual number of abortions performed in the United States ex-
ceeds one and one-half million. NAT'L CoMM. FoR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 18 (1985) 
[hereinafter 'ADOPTION FACTBOOK'j. 
14. It has been reported that in California "[a]pproximately 97 percent of the unwed 
mothers who carry their pregnancy to term are now keeping their children." Handel & Sherwyn, 
Surrogate Parenting: Coming to Grips with tht Future, 18 TRIAL 57 (Apr. 1982). See also 
Perry, Surrogate Contracts: Contractual and Constitutional Conundrums in the Baby "M" 
Case, 9 j. LEGAL MEDICINE 104, 106-07 (1988) [hereinafter 'Perry']. 
15. A study performed by the National Committee for Adoption found that "[b]lack children 
constitute 14 percent of the child population, 34 percent of foster care, and 41 percent of children 
free for adoption." ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 11. Consequently there are 
"thousands of black and bi-racial children who wait for permanent homes" who may be adopted 
in a relatively short period of time. ld. at 32. 
16. Because adopting parents normally want to adopt a healthy infant, "special needs" chil-
dren are frequently difficult to place. There is no shortage of the availability of these children. See 
eneral/~ STAFF OF TH~: SuBCOMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND YoUTH OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
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estimated that in 1984 the chance of a childless couple adopting a 
healthy infant was thirty-five to one. 17 Today, infertile couples have 
few options to end their childlessness. 18 To many the most attractive, 
indeed, the only feasible alternative is surrogacy. 19 
Surrogacy most often represents an attempt by an infertile married 
couple to bear a child who is biologically related to the father. 20 Typi-
cally, the infertile couple enlists the services of a surrogacy 
agency21-usually called a surrogate broker-that is paid22 to match 
the couple with a woman who is willing to act as a surrogate. 23 The 
surrogate24 contracts25 to be inseminated with the father's sperm,26 to 
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print !975). For example, in 1982 
there were 274,000 "special needs" children available for adoption. Only 9,591 of these children 
were adopted. ADOPTION HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 41. 
17. In 1984 over two million couples competed to adopt 58,000 infants Wilson, Adoption: 
It's Sot Impossible, Bus. WK., July 8, 1985, at 112. 
18. Childless couples must either "come to terms with childlessness; tolerate a very long pe-
riod of waiting for an adoption placement; or pursue the adoption of a special needs child. Other 
couples, frustrated and desperate, will buy babies from black market brokers, who apparently do a 
brisk business in today's society." Comment, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for 
Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 127, 129 (1987) [hereinafter 'Commercial'Conceptions'J. 
19. See Robertson, supra note 10, at 29. 
20. Robertson, supra note I 0, at 29. In some cases, however, surrogacy is used because "the 
couple wants to isolate the wife's genetic component because she carries a genetic disease." Keane, 
Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S.ILL.U. L.J. 147, 147-48 [hereinafter 'Keane']. 
This was one of the reasons why the Stern's sought the services of Mary Beth Whitehead. 
21. In 1985 there were two dozen or so organizations providing surrogate mother services in 
the United States. Wrong Mothers, Wrong Babies, EcoNOMIST, Apr. 20-26, 1985 at 63. They 
appear to be full service organizations. They locate the surrogate by advertising through papers, 
match infertile couples to willing surrogates, maintain a medical staff to supervise the artificial 
insemination, and a legal staff to draft the contract. 
22. The surrogate organization requires a fee of between $5,000 and S I 0,000 for the service 
which they provide. Robertson, supra note 10, at 28-29. The Infertility Center of New York, 
which was the surrogate organization involved in the Baby M case, received a fee of $7,500 from 
William Stern. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 476, 537 A.2d 1227, 1271 (1988). 
23. The surrogate is typically found by responding to newspaper advertisements. For exam-
ple, Mary Beth Whitehead responded to the following ad: "SURROGATE MOTHER 
WANTED. Couple unable to have child willing to pay $10,000 fee and expenses to woman to 
carry husband's child. Conception by artificial insemination. All replies strictly confidential." Be-
hind the 'Baby M' Decision: Surrogacy Lawyering Reviewed, 13 Fam. L. Rep. 3019 (BNA)(june 
2, 1987). One surrogate organization in Southern California has published an extensive directory 
of women who are willing to function as surrogates. Davis & Brown, Artificial Insemination by 
Donor (AID) and the Use of Surrogate Mothers, 141 WEsT. ]. Mm. 127, 128 (1984) [hereinafter 
'Davis & Brown']. 
24. Typically these surrogate brokers limit surrogate candidacy to married women who have 
already borne at least one healthy child. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at n.35. Limit-
ing surrogacy to married women may also eliminate the perception that the arrangement is adul-
terous. In most states surrogacy is not adulterous unless the surrogate was impregnated through 
sexual intercourse by a man other than her husband. In a minority of states, however, surrogacy 
could possibly be adulterous because it involves the "surrendering of the reproductive function." 
Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers Univ.) 
107, 112 (1982). In addition a requirement of at least one birth is justifiable because it helps to 
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carry the fetus to term, to relinquish the child immediately after birth 
and to renounce all parental rights in the child by giving her advance 
consent to the child's adoption by the wife of the natural father. 27 The 
surrogate receives a fee, 28 that usually averages $10,000,29 for her time 
and inconvenience.30 In addition, the father must pay for all of the ex-
penses associated with the insemination and the pregnancy. The total 
cost of the procedure may be anywhere between $20,000 and 
$25,000.31 
In spite of its purported biblical origins,32 surrogacy is still a 
ascertain the physical ability of the surrogate to carry the child and her psychological ability to 
give the child up for adoption. Comment, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 201-02 (1986) [hereinafter 'Redefining Mother']. 
25. Surrogate contracts typically provide that the surrogate may not smoke, use alcohol or 
drugs, or take aspirin without the overseeing obstetrician's written consent. These contracts also 
provide that the surrogate cannot abort the fetus without the father's consent. A copy of the surro-
gate contract between William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead is found in Appendix A of the 
court's decision in the Baby M case. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 470-74, 537 A.2d at 1265-69. See 
generally Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (1982). 
26. Ordinarily the surrogate is artificially inseminated with the father's sperm, although oc-
casionally insemination will occur through intercourse. Artificial insemination is the manual intro-
duction, by a physician, of a man's sperm into the surrogate's vagina. See generally W. FINE-
GOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5-7 (2d ed. 1976). There are many different forms of artificial 
insemination. A discussion of these is beyond the scope of this comment. 
27. See generally W. WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DoMESTIC REI.A-
TIONS 443 (1984). 
28. A fee is not always part of the agreement. Gratuitous surrogacy occasionally occurs, but 
is a rare event. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at n.30. 
29. A surrogate's fees normally range from $5,000 to $13,000. Some couples have indicated 
that they are willing to pay as much as $40,000 to $50,000 for a surrogate. Comment, Surrogate 
Mothering: Medical Reality in a Legal Vacuum, 8 J. LFGIS. 140, 147 (1981) [hereinafter, 'Surro-
gate Mothering']. 
30. The fee arrangement is perhaps the only reason why surrogacy exists. Even surrogacy 
proponents admit that "a prohibition on compensation for surrogate motherhood [would] be 
equivalent to a prohibition of the practice," because few women would be willing to become a 
surrogate without an attractive financial reward. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial 
Findings, 140 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 117 (1983)[hereinafter 'Parker', Initial Findings']. See also 
Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 373, 380 (1981) [herein-
after 'Black']. 
31. This cost includes the fee paid to the surrogate and the surrogate broker, in addition to 
the necessary medical and legal fees. See Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate 
Mother's Right to "Rent Her Womb" for a Fee, 18 GoNZ. L. REV. 539, 542 (1983) [hereinafter 
'Baby Sitting Consideration']. See also Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at n.37. 
32. Proponents of surrogacy recall the story of Abraham and Hagar in an effort to legitimize 
the practice. See generally Genesis 16: 1-6; 30:1-10. 
While proponents of surrogacy attempt to legitimize the practice by citing its biblical origins, 
they fail to recount the difficulties the arrangement created for the parties involved. For a discus-
sion of those problems see Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 133-34. Similar problems 
have also occurred with the modern practice of surrogacy. The Baby M case provides an excellent 
illustration of the complexities involved with this practice. See supra note 3. The Malahoff-Stiver 
dilemma is also instructive. See infra note 79. 
Proponents also fail to recognize that an important difference between biblical surrogacy and 
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rather new and infrequently used innovation;33 nevertheless, the evi-
dence suggests that its use is rising.34 Before the popularity of surro-
gacy increases further, it is necessary that the states determine their 
policy regarding the practice. To date, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska 
and Utah are the only states to have come to grips with this duty. 311 
Other states, by default, have left resolution of the important issues 
involved in surrogacy to the courts. 38 
Although most states do not have specific surrogacy legislation,37 
all states have laws governing adoption and baby-selling. 38 In the ab-
sence of surrogacy legislation, these are the laws that courts must use to 
determine the rights of the parties to the surrogate contract in the event 
of a breach. 31 Many commentators have argued that specific surrogacy 
legislation is necessary in order to formally establish a state's policy 
regarding surrogacy because adoption and baby-selling laws were not 
intended to' 'cover the surrogate arrangement.4° Furthermore, the ab-
sence of surrogate legislation allows the courts to disregard the unique 
factors that prompted the surrogate contract and to treat an indivisible 
transaction like a more typical adoption or child-custody battle. 41 
Others argue that new legislation is unnecessary because present laws 
can be construed to cover the practice. 42 
contemporary surrogacy is that the rormer was a gratuitous arrangement and the latter is a com-
mercial transaction where the surrogate receives a substantial ree. See infra note 29. 
33. The ract that only about 600 children have been born by surrogate mothers indicates that 
the practice is still very limited. Set supra note I. Set also Robertson, sujJra note I 0, at 28. 
34. See supra note I. 
35. See supra note 8. 
36. In spite or legislative inaction, there is case law in several states that has either mildly 
endorsed or banned surrogacy. See In rt Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988)(declared 
surrogacy against public policy); Yates v. Keane, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. 1988)(sur-
rogate contract invalid under Michigan law and United States Constitution); Surrogate Parenting 
Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)(surrogacy does not violate state adoption or 
baby-selling laws, but a surrogate has the right to withdraw her consent to the contract for five 
days after birth); Adoption or Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
1986)(New York law does not presently preclude surrogacy, however this is a question for the 
legislature). 
3 7. See supra note I 
38. Pierce, supra note I. Utah's baby-selling statute is discussed infra at note I 00. 
39. There are three ways in which the surrogate contract can be breached by the surrogate. 
She could reruse to be inseminated, she could exercise her right to an abortion, and she could 
refuse to allow the child to be adopted. The rather can breach the contract by refusing to pay the 
surrogate or refusing to accept the child. 
40. Redefining Mother, supra note 24 at 192. They argue that adoption laws are inadequate 
to handle the surrogate arrangement. For this reason courts are incompetent to deal with surro-
gacy because they can only do so on an ad hoc basis. 
4 I. /d. 
42. See Comment, Contracts To Bear a Child, 667 CALIF. L. Rt:v. 611 (I 978). 
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III. THE ARGUMENTS OvER SuRROGACY 
The arguments both for and against the practice of surrogacy are 
compelling. Proponents argue that any governmental attempt to regu-
late or forbid the practice is unconstitutional because it involves a fun-
damental right that is inferred from the right to privacy. Opponents 
argue that state tolerance of the practice violates public policy because 
it makes a child the object of commerce. What follows is an analysis of 
the basic arguments presented both for and against surrogacy. 
A. Surrogacy as a Constitutionally Protected Right 
1. The right of privacy 
It is now firmly entrenched in our constitutional jurisprudence 
that certain relationships are protected by the right to privacy.'3 Propo-
nents of surrogate motherhood contend that the right to obtain or to 
bear a child by surrogacy is a fundamental right that is entitled to con-
stitutional protection.•• This contention is grounded in a long line of 
cases that protect the individual from unwarranted intrusions by the 
state into matters that pertain to child-bearing and child-rearing.'11 
Both the right of an individual to be free from governmental interfer-
ence in the use of contraceptives'6 and the right of a woman to have an 
abortion47 are rights protected by the right to privacy.'8 The Supreme 
Court's decisions establishing these rights suggest that not only does an 
individual have a constitutional right not to procreate, but that the con-
stitution also protects the individual's right to procreate.'9 Proponents 
of surrogacy argue that the right to procreate necessarily implies the 
43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
44. Surrogacy is constitutionally justified because "the attempt involves an aspect of the mar-
ital relationship that the right to privacy has protected since its earliest articulations: raising chil-
dren. Surrogate parenthood is generally nothing more than an attempt by couples who cannot bear 
children by ordinary means to share in that experience." Keane, supra note 20, at 155-56. 
45. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or. 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453 (1972) 
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
48. The origins of the right to privacy remain unclear. In Griswold, Justice Douglas said 
that the right may be implied from the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. 381 U.S. 
at 484-85. In Roe, Justice Blackmun said that the right is implied from the fourteenth amend-
ment's "concept of personal liberty." 410 U.S. at 153. 
49. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(the right to procreate is a fundamental 
right. To sterilize criminals convicted of certain felonies, while not sterilizing other criminals 
guilty of equally grave offenses, is a denial of due process). 
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existence of another right, namely the right to use any available means 
to enjoy one's right of procreation.110 
If this characterization is true, any statute prohibiting surrogacy 
would be an unconstitutional violation of the privacy111 expectations of 
both the surrogate mother and the man who hired her to bear his child, 
unless the state could demonstrate that prohibiting the relationship 
would further a compelling state interest and that the prohibition is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. 112 
2. Equal protection 
Another constitutional impediment to prohibiting surrogacy may 
be found in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 113 
All states currently allow men to receive payment for sperm dona-
tions,114 yet all states also have baby-selling statutes that prevent a wo-
man from selling her reproductive capability. 1111 Proponents of surrogacy 
contend that the two services are indistinguishable. Both involve the 
sale of that which is created by reproductive organs.116 For a state to 
50. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 139-40. 
51. However, the right to privacy is not absolute. This was made quite clear in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct 2841 (1986), where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the right 
to privacy conferred a broad right of sexual privacy. The Court said, 
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new 
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable 
and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law 
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the 8onstitution. 
!d. at 2846. In addition, Justice Blackmun noted in Roe that the right of privacy and the "unlim-
ited right to do with one's own body as one pleases are not the same." Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
52. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). Admittedly, this is a test 
which the government can seldom pass. However, opponents of surrogacy argue that surrogacy 
does not involve the right of privacy, therefore, any regulation of the practice need only be ration-
ally related to a legitimate government objective. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, 581-84 (1978). Opponents argue that the right of privacy is not an issue with 
surrogacy because the right "is intended to guarantee the right of an individual to control his or 
her own reproductive faculties, not to commission and monitor the pregnancy of a third party." 
Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 152. Additionally, the parties to the surrogate contract 
are not, as Roe requires, "isolated in [their] privacy." /d. at 141. 
53. The equal protection clause provides that "[n)o State shall ... deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
54. Sperm donors usually receive as much as $20 to $35 for a vial of sperm. Curie-Cohen, 
Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 
300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 586-87 (1979). 
55. See supra note 38. 
56. Black, supra note 30, at 380. This argument ignores that there is a difference between 
semen donation, pregnancy and childbirth. "Pregnancy and childbirth are hazardous, time-con-
suming, painful conditions which few women can be expected to experience for the sake of some-
one else unless they receive meaningful compensation." Keane, supra note 20, at 153. However, if 
a surrogate does have a greater risk than does a sperm donor then perhaps the surrogate and 
sperm donor are not similarly situated, and there is no equal protection argument. 
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permit a man to receive compensation for the sale of his reproductive 
capability but deny a woman the same opportunity is to discriminate on 
the basis of sex, which is forbidden under the equal protection clause 
unless the prohibition is substantially related to an important govern-
mental objective.117 
B. Surrogacy as Violative of Public Policy 
Opponents of surrogacy find many of its aspects objectionable. 
Most of those objections are grounded in public policy concerns. 
1. Public policy considerations 
a. Baby-selling statutes. Opponents of surrogacy are perhaps most 
offended by the practice because of the large fees that are paid to the 
broker and the surrogate mother. 118 Proponents of the practice argue 
that surrogacy is indistinguishable from a personal services contract or 
a rental agreement, and that the fee paid to the surrogate can be either 
considered as payment for nine months of her services or as a rental fee 
for nine months use of the surrogate's womb. 119 Opponents, however, 
assert that the label given the contract does not disguise the fact that the 
transaction is, in essence, one for the sale of a child.60 There are several 
factors that point to this conclusion. 
Baby-selling statutes typically provide that a person who sells or 
attempts to sell a child for any purpose, including in connection with 
an adoption, is guilty of a criminal offense.61 The surrogate contract 
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Gender based discrimination is only entitled to an 
intermediate level of scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Accordingly, laws which discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender satisfy the clause if they are substantially related to an important 
governmental objective. More recently, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to increase the 
scrutiny given to gender based discrimination, by adding the requirement that there must be an 
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender based classification. Mississippi University 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982). 
58. They argue that the payment of fees for the birth of a child commodifies the child, op-
presses the mother, and denigrates the value of human life. See generally Commercial Concep-
tions, supra note 18, at 142-47. 
59. See generally Baby Sitting Consideration, supra note 31. 
60. FIELD, supra note 1, at 164 n.5. "Most contracts . . provide for no payment to the 
mother if she miscarries, even after many months of pregnancy; instead they condition payment 
upon the handing over of a live child. Clearly, such restrictions are incompatible with the charac-
terization of payment for "services" or "rent". The contract involved in the Baby M case is indica-
tive of this. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 470-74, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-69 (1988). Considering 
this, the court said, "[i]t strains credulity to claim that these arrangements, touted by those in the 
surrogacy business as an attractive alternative to the usual route leading to an adoption, really 
amount to something other than a private placement adoption for money." /d. at 1241. 
61. See for example the discussion of Utah's baby selling statute, infra notes 100-07 and 
accompanying text. Payment of a woman's reasonable maternity, medical and necessary living 
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itself illustrates that the contract is one for the sale of a child instead of 
for rent or personal services. Surrogate contracts typically provide that 
the surrogate's fee will be withheld until the surrogate has fully com-
plied with the contract by terminating her parental rights in order to 
facilitate adoption. 62 In addition, these contracts also provide that if the 
child is stillborn the agreement terminates even though her services 
have been fully rendered. 63 Under this arrangement it is virtually im-
possible to separate the services component of the contract from the 
goods component.64 If the child is not delivered in good condition, the 
money is not paid, even though the service has been performed.65 
Therefore, to argue that this transaction does not constitute baby selling 
is misleading because it ignores the substance of the agreement. 66 
Another fact points to the transaction as one for the sale of a baby 
instead of one for personal services. Research has shown that women 
ordinarily will not become surrogates unless they are paid. This, cou-
pled with the contractual provisions, suggests that the surrogate fully 
realizes that she is being paid solely to manufacture and market a 
good. 67 
b. Lack of voluntary or informed consent. Surrogacy opponents 
also argue that the fee arrangement exploits surrogates.68 They argue 
expenses is generally held not to violate baby-selling statutes. Note, Developing a Concept of the 
Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 Gm. L.J. 1283 n.54 
(1984) [hereinafter 'Surrogate Act']. 
62. See supra note 60. See B. Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 
62-71 (unpublished manuscript available in Journal of Public Law office, Brigham Young Cni-
versity, J. Reuben Clark Law School) [hereinafter 'Atwell'], where the author argues that the 
surrogate is paid a "success fee" which clearly constitutes baby-selling. 
63. Atwell, supra note 62. 
64. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 142-48. 
65. Atwell, supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
66. Perhaps a more convincing argument can be made that the transaction involves, not the 
sale of a child, but rather the sale of parental rights to a child. There is little practical difference. 
As one commentator has noted, the "[s]ale of [a surrogate's] parental rights is the equivalent of 
sale of the child." Means, Surrogacy v. The Thirteenth Amendment, IV N.Y. LAw ScH. HuM. 
R-rs. ANN. 445 (1987) [hereinafter 'Means']. 
67. There are, however, a few women who are willing to function as surrogates for purely 
altruistic reasons. They are motivated out of compassion and want to give infertile couples "the 
gift of life". Parker, Initial Findings, supra note 30 at 118. Mary Beth Whitehead claimed this 
was her motivation in becoming a surrogate. This statement, however, lacks credibility because she 
became a surrogate at the same time the second mortgage on her house was being foreclosed. In re 
Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 440, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988). Some women, many of whom are 
single, wish to become surrogates to experience pregnancy without having to accept the responsi-
bilities attendant with motherhood. Robertson, supra note I 0, at 35. Others become surrogates to 
atone for a prior abortion and attempt to eliminate any feelings of guilt. Parker. Initial Findings, 
supra note 30, at 118. However, it is clear that the vast majority of surrogates participate in 
surrogacy for the money. /d. 
68. See generally Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18. See also In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 
396, 434-44, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-50 (1988). 
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that the promise of high fees lure many into the arrangement without 
fully appreciating the consequences of the contract.69 Despite the fact 
that she consents to give up her child, the promise of $10,000 may 
prevent an impoverished70 surrogate from making a totally voluntary 
decision.71 Indeed, any consent that is given before the child is actually 
delivered, let alone conceived, is not voluntary or informed with regard 
to the child because it is impossible to predict how the surrogate will 
feel after the child is born. 72 
c. The child as a commodity. Perhaps the most important objection 
to the fee arrangement is that it degrades human life because it creates 
the opportunity for the parties to treat the child as a commodity.73 The 
child is not created for his own sake, nor are the child's best interests 
considered;74 indeed, they cannot be before the child is born. 711 The only 
factor considered is that of promoting the happiness of an infertile 
couple.76 The substantial investment77 that the father makes in his 
child only commercializes the child further because that investment 
brings with it an expectation of product quality.78 Nothing prevents a 
disappointed father from rejecting a deformed or retarded infant when 
his expectations are not met. This possibility was tragically illustrated 
in a 1983 surrogacy agreement.79 
69. "This financial incentive may be sufficient to induce a woman to enter into the surrogacy 
agreement - an agreement she probably would not otherwise make and one that she may later 
regret." Atwell, supra note 62, at 60. 
70. A study of the motivations of potential surrogates revealed that most were financially 
needy. Parker, Initial Findings, supra note 30, at 118. 
71. See infra notes 121-40 and accompanying text. 
72. /d. 
73. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 142-48. 
74. But see Keane, supra note 20, at 156, which suggests that it is perhaps a good thing that 
normal parental motivation is not subject to the scrutiny given to a surrogate's motivation. Indeed, 
is a child ever created because his parents are looking out for the child's best interests' 
75. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
76. Often the reason that the couple is unable to have children is because the wife has post-
poned child-rearing to pursue professional aspirations. FIF.l.D, supra note 1, at 60-61. 
77. Although it varies from organization to organization, a couple will pay on the average 
$25,000 for a child born by a surrogate. This cost includes the fee paid to the surrogate and the 
baby broker as well as the surrogate's medical costs, psychological fees, legal fees, life insurance 
costs, etc. Baby Sitting Consideration, supra note 31, at 542-43. 
78. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 146. 
79. In 1982, Judy Stiver and Alexander Malahoff entered into a surrogate contract. Under 
the terms of the contract, Mrs. Stiver was to abstain from sexual intercourse until she conceived by 
artificial insemination. In January 1983, she gave birth to a boy. The child, however, was born 
with microcephaly, the symptom of which is an abnormally small head. Microcephaly frequently 
results in mental retardation. 
Malahoff refused to accept the impaired child. He claimed it was not his, and demanded 
blood tests to determine the child's paternity. The Stivers also did not want the child. Blood tests 
were administered and the results announced on the Donahue television program. The tests indi-
cated that Malahoff was not the father. Malahoff was relieved but had already decided that if he 
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2. Contractual provisions 
Opponents of surrogacy also find the contractual provisions of the 
arrangement offensive. They claim that the contract violates public pol-
icy because it purports to eliminate the surrogate's right to an abortion 
and because it attempts to circumvent adoption laws. 
a. Abortion. Typically, surrogate contracts provide that the surro-
gate waives her right to abort. 80 Opponents of surrogacy ironically81 
argue that the purported waiver of a woman's fundamental right to an 
abortion is invalid.82 They argue that if a husband cannot veto his 
wife's decision to have an abortion,83 this veto power cannot be given to 
a father in the surrogate context. 84 Furthermore, specific performance 
of this contractual provision constitutes state action which violates the 
surrogate's right to privacy811 and the thirteenth amendment's prohibi-
tion against involuntary servitude.86 
b. Prenatal consent to adoption. The surrogate contract also vio-
lates public policy by attempting to terminate the parental rights of the 
mother before those rights have even vested. 87 Many states preclude 
prenatal consent to adoption, generally requiring a certain number of 
days after birth before the mother may voluntarily terminate her paren-
tal rights. 88 Indeed, even after those rights have been terminated, termi-
was the father he would give the child up for adoption. Later Mr. Stiver revealed that in a 
previous marriage he had fathered a mi<-rocephalic child who had died. 
This is a tragic example of a situation where a child was viewed as a commodity. It is a 
tragedy not only because of the reaction of the parents, (there is current!} a multimillion dollar 
lawsuit pending between Malahoff and the Stivers) but more importantly because no one was 
concerned with the interests of the child. See Surrogate Act, supra note 61. at 1285-86. 
80. "Abortions are not generally allowed [under the contract] unless such action is necessary 
for the physical health of the surrogate." Baby Sitting Consideration, supra note 31, at 544. 
81. Many opponents of surrogacy feel that the practice should be prohibited in order to 
preserve the traditional family structure. See Perry, supra note 14, at 108. It is ironic that they 
invoke the right of privacy, which has the potential of forever altering the traditional family struc-
ture, to argue that surrogacy is against public policy. Additionally, it is ironic that both proponents 
and opponents use the right of privacy to justify their views. 
82. See generally Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate 
Mothers, 99 HARV. L. R.:v. 1936, (1986) [hereinafter 'Rumpelstiltskin']. 
83. "Clearly since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion ... the State cannot dele-
gate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion '' Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
84. Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 82, at 1940 
85. Comment, Constitutional Analysis of the Baby M Decision, 11 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 
19, 51 (1988) [hereinafter 'Constitutional Analysis']. 
86. The Thirteenth Amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . 
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction'' U.S. CaNST. 
amend. XIII, § l. Forcing the surrogate to bear a child which she does not want to bear would 
place her in involuntary servitude to the father. 
87. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
88. Atwell, supra note 62, at 31-34. 
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nation may be revocable for several months.89 In addition, many states 
have specific procedures that must be followed before a termination of 
parental rights is permitted.90 Typically, those procedures provide that 
absent some showing of parental neglect parental rights will not be ter-
minated,91 because it is the policy of the state to leave children with 
their natural parents.92 To allow termination to occur without comply-
ing with the statutory provisions is to deny the surrogate her constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in her child. 93 The surrogate contract, 
however, purports to circumvent this legislative intent through a simple 
contract. 
3. Surrogacy v. adoption 
Opponents also argue that because the long term effects of surro-
gacy on the participants are unknown, the practice should be prohib-
ited. Surrogacy could affect the surrogate's mental health,94 alter her 
relationship with her other children911 and create difficulties for the 
adopting couple as well. 98 In addition, the transaction may dramatically 
affect the child who is the subject of the surrogate transaction. Propo-
nents of surrogacy are likely to deny that learning one was conceived 
through a surrogacy arrangement is any more stressful than learning 
that one was adopted. There may be some merit to this argument. 
89. "[M]any states provide that even if the biological parents give consent after the child's 
birth, that consent may be revoked with relative ease within a short period of time." /d. at 32. See 
also In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 429-31, 537 A.2d 1227, 1244 (1988). 
90. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-3a-48 (1985). For a description of the effect of this statute on 
surrogacy see infra notes I 00-07 and accompanying text. 
91. ld. 
92. See State ex rei Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976). 
93. See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
380 (1979). 
94. The surrogate may feel a deep sense of loss and guilt upon relinquishing the child. De-
pression may last for weeks, Robertson, supra note I 0, at 29, and may necessitate psychiatric 
counselling. Davis & Brown, supra note 23, at 129. 
95. Presumably other children of a surrogate mother must be told something when the 
mother does not come home from the hospital with a baby. A child is not likely to understand if he 
is told that his mother gave the baby away. Indeed, he may begin to question whether he, like his 
sibling, is equally eKpendable. See generally Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, 13 
HASTINGS CENTER RF:P. 35 (1983) [hereinafter 'Krimmel']. 
96. The natural father may "concentrate his love on the child, thereby excluding the wife 
from the familial relationship. Alternatively, as the child matures the father may resent the child 
or develop guilt feelings with the realization that his satisfaction in the child might not be shared 
by his spouse." Surrogate Mothering, supra note 29, at 105. On the other hand the adoptive 
mother is likely to feel guilty about her nonpartictpatory role in giving the child life and may 
"develop feelings of jealousy and animosity for the [child]." !d. at 154. Both parents, however, 
must be prepared to cope with having been participants in a "relationship that many consider to 
be immoral or deviant." Robertson, supra note 10, at 29. 
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Adoptees typically have difficulty adjusting to this knowledge.97 How-
ever, an adopted child and a child born to a surrogate may not be simi-
larly situated because the child born to a surrogate bears the added 
burden of knowing that her mother gave her up for a $10,000 fee. 
Surrogacy is not the same as adoption. They may appear to be 
similar, nevertheless, they have different purposes.98 Justifying the 
practice of surrogacy by its similarity to adoption ignores their differ-
ence. One commentator has expressed the difference as follows: 
Traditional adoptions are child rescue operations, not palliatives for 
disappointed parents. The current adoption system allocates lives in 
being; the child is already in crisis. In short, adoption poses the least 
detrimental alternative for the child. In marked contrast, the host 
mother in a surrogate parenting contract conceives the child intention-
ally for the very purpose of exchanging the child for money. Rather 
than centering on the needs of a child, the surrogate model exists pri-
marily to satiate the psychic and financial needs of adult parties.99 
This is perhaps one of the most compelling reasons why surrogacy 
should not be condoned. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF UTAH LAW 
Whether the Surrogate Motherhood Act was needed depends on 
the present status of surrogacy under Utah law. An analysis of the ex-
isting laws indicates that surrogacy was prohibited even before the 
adoption of the Act. 
A. Baby-Selling 
Utah law specifically prohibits the sale of children 100 by providing 
that persons guilty of selling or attempting to sell or otherwise dispose 
of a child for money or other consideration are guilty of a third degree 
97. See generally j. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED 
PEOPLE (1973). 
98. Krimmel, supra note 95, at 35. 
99. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 144-45. 
100. UTAH Com: ANN. § 76-7-203 (1973) provides: 
Any person, while having custody, control, or possession of any child, who sells, or 
disposes of, or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in consideration of the 
payment of money or other thing of value is guilty of a felony of the third degree; 
provided, however, this section shall not make it unlawful for any person, agency, or 
corporation to pay the actual and reasonable maternity, connected medical or hospital 
and necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement as an 
art of charity, so long as payment is not made for the purpose of inducing the mother. 
parent, or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to the adoption, or co-
operate in the completion of the adoption. 
!d. There is no case law interpreting this statute. 
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felony .101 An exception allows for the payment of the actual and rea-
sonable expenses connected with the pregnancy and birth of the child, 
however, such payment must be charitable in nature. 102 Therefore, it 
appears that the statute is violated if payment of the bills associated 
with the pregnancy are for the purpose of inducing the mother to coop-
erate in the placement of the child for adoption. 
This statute alone may prohibit the entire surrogacy arrange-
ment.103 Under the surrogate contract the surrogate is promised a fee to 
release the child to the father. It appears that if she complies with the 
contract that she has violated the statute. However, the statute only 
prohibits commercial surrogacy. A woman who is willing to bear the 
child gratuitously does not violate the statute. 
But what about the father? 104 The statute speaks only in terms of 
the seller of the child; it appears that under this statute the father can-
not be prosecuted for having purchased the baby105 It can be argued 
that because his payment for the surrogate's medical expenses are not 
charitable that the statute also reaches his purchase. However, it can 
just as easily be argued that even though the statute precludes a person 
paying medical expenses, if such payment is for the purpose of induc-
ing the mother to place the child for adoption, that the statute fails to 
specify any punishment for doing so. 
However, the fact that the surrogate may be prosecuted under this 
law and the father cannot may be of little significance. The fact that 
101. ld. The maximum penalty for a third degree felony is five years imprisonment. UTAH 
ConE ANN. § 76-1-201 (1983). 
102. The requirement of a charitable purpose appears to place a motivational limitation on 
the person paying the expenses. It appears that unless this payment was motivated out of a genu-
ine concern for the woman's health, safety or financial well being, thilt the statute would be vio-
lated. This would preclude the natural father in a surrogacy contract from poying the surrogate 
mother's medical expenses, because his motivation does not go to the mother, rather it goes solely 
to the child produced under the contract. 
103. But see Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S. W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)(sur-
rogacy does not violate the state's baby-selling law). 
104. There is some question as to whether baby-selling statutes apply in this context. Argua-
bly, these statutes were enaned to prevent someone other than the natural father from purchasing 
his own child. It has been questioned whether the father can violate these statutes at all because it 
seems axiomatic that one cannot buy that which is already his. However, the agreement could be 
characterized as one for the sale of parental rights, which may violate the statute. See generally 
Means, supra note 66 and accompanying text. Clearly these statutes would apply if the natural 
father's wife were the party to the contract. Therefore, the reason the wife is always left out of the 
contract between the father and the surrogate is to eliminate the appearance of a third party 
buying a baby. 
105. Failure to direct this statute at the purchaser of the child makes only the sale of the 
child a criminal violation. Because the purchaser is under no threat of prosecution. 1t is coneeiva-
ble that he eould simply raise the price he is willing to pay for the child to compensate the 
surrogate for the risk of ineurring a criminal penalty for selling the child. 
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only one of the parties to the transaction has criminal liability has the 
effect of drastically limiting the transaction, which is arguably the pur-
pose of the statute anyway. Therefore, it appears that this statute le-
gally and practically prevents commercial surrogacy from taking place 
in Utah. 106 However, it probably does not prevent gratuitous surrogacy, 
especially if the surrogate pays her own medical expenses. 107 
B. Surrogacy as an Independent Adoption 
Arguably, surrogacy is merely a form of independent adoption be-
cause the ultimate goal of the arrangement is to make the adopting 
couple the legal parents of the child created under the contract. 108 
Many states discourage independent adoptions109 in favor of requiring 
persons wishing to adopt to work through a state licensed agency. Utah 
law, however, permits independent adoptions by permitting unlicensed 
individuals to assist in bringing the parties together. 110 But, indepen-
dent adoption is permitted only as long as "no payment, charge, fee, 
reimbursement or expense, or exchange of value of any kind, or prom-
ise or agreement to make the same [is] made for that assistance."111 
This statute seriously restricts surrogacy arrangements by preclud-
ing the use of the surrogate broker; indeed, to the extent the broker is 
106. The lack of a law defining the rights of individuals who avail themselves of artificial 
insemination is yet another legal impediment to surrogacy in Utah. Under Utah law there is a 
presumption "that a child born to the wife during marriage is the legitimate offspring of herself 
and her husband." Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1974). The 
child born to a surrogate, however, is not the child of the surrogate's husband, and it may be 
difficult for the surrogate's husband to establish that the child is not his because of Utah's adher-
ence to the Lord Mansfield Rule which, in effect, prevents either spouse from giving testimony 
that would bastardize the child. Id. Other states have eliminated this problem by enacting laws 
governing artificial insemination. These laws provide that if the husband consents to his wife 
being artificially inseminated that any child born after the artificial insemination is treated as if it 
were the child of the husband. See generally Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 
1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 935. Surrogacy contracts typically state that the surrogate's husband does 
not consent to the artificial insemination in order to rebut the implications of such laws. 
107. But few women would be willing to do this. See Black, supra note 30. 
108. Atwell, supra note 62, at 16. 
109. Several commentators have criticized independent adoptions because more abuses 
tend to occur through independent adoptions than through agency adoptions. For ex-
ample, a child placed for adoption through an independent procedure is more likely to 
become a victim of the black market. Moreover, some studies conclude that there is a 
greater risk that the biological parents will not receive proper counseling regarding the 
decision to place the child for adoption. There also appears to be a greater risk that the 
placement will not be permanent due to some intervening problem. 
Atwell, supra note 62, at 20-21. 
110. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 62A-4-202(2)(a)(l988). 
Ill. /d. The statute does not, however, preclude "payment of fees for medical, legal, or other 
lawful services rendered in connection with the care of a mother, delivery and care of a child, or 
lawful adoption proceedings .... "UTAH CoDE ANN. § 62A-4-202(3)(1988). 
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used, the statute may totally prohibit the practice. 112 Under the typical 
surrogacy contract, the individual or organization that matches the sur-
rogate mother with the infertile couple receives a substantial fee for its 
services. 113 Because the surrogate contract itself is ultimately consum-
mated for the sole purpose of creating an adoptable child, it is ines-
capable that the surrogate broker's fee includes a healthy profit to the 
broker for bringing the two parties to the contract together. 114 This, 
however, is expressly forbidden under Utah's Child Placement Law1111 
and results in both criminal and civil penalties. 116 Commercial surro-
gacy, therefore, is impermissible because the intermediary receives an 
illegal fee. 
C. Termination of Parental Rights 
The laws governing the termination of parental rights are also fa-
tal to surrogacy in Utah. Surrogate contracts purport to terminate the 
parental rights of the surrogate mother in order to facilitate the adop-
tion of the child by the father's wife. Such an agreement is unenforce-
able under Utah law! 17 Only a court may decree a termination of pa-
rental rights! 18 A termination decree may be ordered only after a 
112. It is doubtful whether surrogacy would occur but for the services provided by the surro-
gate broker. See Black, supra note 30. 
113. The fee usually averages between $5,000 and $10,000. See supra notes 21-23 and ac-
companying text. 
114. The surrogate broker's fee also includes the costs of artificially inseminating the surro-
gate and drawing up the surrogate contract. See contract between William Stern and Infertility 
Center of New York in Appendix B of the Baby M case. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 475-78, 
537 A.2d 1227, 1271-73 (1988). 
/d. 
115. See supra note II 0 and accompanying text. 
116. UTAH Com: ANN. § 62A-4-203 (1988). This section provides: 
(1) The division or any interested person may commence an action in district court to 
enjoin any person, agency, firm, corporation, or association violating Section 62A-4-
202. 
(2) A county attorney or the attorney general shall institute legal action as necessary to 
enforce the provisions of Section 62A-4-202 ... 
(3) In addition to the remedies provided in Subsections (1) and (2), any person, agency, 
firm, corporation, or association found to be in violation of Section 62A-4-202 shall 
forfeit all proceeds identified as resulting from the transaction, and may also be assessed 
a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. Every act in violation of 
Section 62A-4-202, including each placement or attempted placement of a child, is a 
separate violation. 
117. Utah law indicates that there is a strong, but rebuttable, presumption that the interests 
of the child are best served by remaining in the custody of his natural parents. Therefore, termina-
tion is not appropriate unless clear and convincing evidence indicates otherwise. See In re Castillo, 
632 P.2d 855 (Utah 1981); State ex rei. Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976). 
118. "A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hearing is held specifi-
cally on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or parents." UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-
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hearing where parental unfitness, abandonment or failure to show the 
normal interest of a natural parent119 is shown by clear and convincing 
evidence. 120 The law does provide for termination upon voluntary peti-
tion of one or both of the parties, however, this does not eliminate the 
hearing requirement. 
D. The Utah Adoption Law 
Finally, surrogacy is clearly prohibited under the Utah Adoption 
Law. 121 A critical feature of the surrogate contract is the surrogate's 
consent, long before conception, to relinquish her parental rights in the 
child and to permit it to be placed for adoption following its birth. This 
agreement violates the Utah Adoption Law in several respects. 
The statute provides that "[a] child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of each living parent having rights in relation to said child ... 
. "
122 Consent must be given in the presence of a district court judge.123 
The purpose of this requirement is to assure the court that consent is 
both informed and voluntary. 124 Surrogate contracts violate this re-
quirement. The contract purports to obtain the surrogate's consent to 
the adoption long before the child is conceived. Such advance consent is 
neither informed, voluntary nor possible under the statute. 
Before conception, indeed, before birth, the surrogate lacks suffi-
cient information to make an informed choice. 12~ Only after the surro-
gate has given birth can she truly make an informed choice to place her 
child for adoption. Until the child is born the mother is unaware of the 
bond that has developed between her and her child.126 Only after she 
3a-48 (1985). 
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(1)(1985). 
120. Before a state may irrevocably terminate the rights parents have in their children, due 
process requires that the state must support its allegations by at least a clear and convincing 
evidence standard. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 (Utah 
1981). 
121. UTAH CoDE ANN.§§ 78-30-1 to 78-30-18 (1953). 
122. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-4(1)(1981). 
123. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-8 (1953). The statute also provides that if the person whose 
consent is necessary is not in the county, the court may appoint a commissioner to take her written 
consent and "[t]he commissioner shall explain to such person the legal significance of such consent, 
and shall certify to the court his findings as to whether the consent is freely given." 
124. See Taylor v. Waddoups, 121 Utah 279, 241 P.2d 157 (Utah 1952). 
125. "How well can a surrogate mother applicant understand and comprehend, prior to the 
artificial insemination how she will feel when she relinquishes the child'" Parker, Surrogate 
Motherhood, Psychiatric Screening and Informed Consent, Baby Selling, and Public Policy, 12 
BuLL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY LAW 21, 27 (1984). 
126. Gaffney, Maternal-Fetal Attachment in Relation to Self-Concept and Anxiety, 1982 
MATERNAL-CHILD NuRSING J. 91. "Attachment begins with the ... sensations created by fetal 
movement which validate the mother's awareness of another~an awareness that continues 
throughout pregnancy." Id. at 92. 
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has held her baby can she even partially comprehend the consequences 
of permanently severing her parental relationship with that baby. 127 
Hence, any consent given before the child is born is necessarily 
uninformed. 128 
Generally, the expectations of competent parties who have entered 
into a contract will be enforced.129 However, freedom of contract is a 
qualified right. 130 Agreements may be unenforceable if one of the par-
ties was unduly influenced to enter into the agreement. 131 
In the surrogacy context, the fee paid to the surrogate and her 
unequal bargaining position may be sufficient to render her consent 
involuntary. Preliminary research indicates that surrogacy candidates 
are typically poorly educated, unemployed or receiving public assis-
tance.132 The high fee associated with surrogacy may unduly influence 
a financially needy woman's decision to become a surrogate because the 
money appears to be so easy to earn.133 The promise of receiving an 
easy $10,000 may cloud the potential surrogate's judgment to the extent 
that she is unable to fully appreciate the consequences of her con-
tract-that she is expected to forever relinquish her child once it is 
born.134 
Utah law suggests that the policy of the state is to protect volun-
One commentator notes even a woman who has previously given birth "may not be able to 
predict her emotional state when the child she has agreed to surrender is born pursuant to the 
surrogate parenting agreement." Atwell, supra note 62, at 51-52. 
127. "A parent can be unexpectedly smitten with profound connection to the newborn child 
at birth, and a parent who tries (for whatever reason) to give a child away, can find it impossible 
to go through with the parting." Wolf, Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood Agreements: The 
Trouble With Specific Performance, IV N.Y.L. ScH. HuM. R"rs. 375, 400 (1987). 
128. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988)("any decision prior to 
the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed"). 
129. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 5.1 (1982) [hereinafter 'FARNSWORTH, 
CoNTRACTs']. 
130. "No legal system devised by man has even been reckless enough to make all promises 
enforceable." Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 
COLUM. L. REV. 576, 591 (1969). 
131. RESTAH:MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1979) [hereinafter 'RESTATF.Mt:NT, 
CoNTRACTs']. Undue influence is an equitable doctrine that "give[s] relief to victims of unfair 
transactions that were induced by improper persuasion." FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS, supra note 
130, at § 4.9. 
A contract may also be unenforceable when entered into pursuant to duress, RESTATEMENT, 
CoNTRACTS§§ 174-76, or mistake, id. at§§ 151-58. 
132. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
133. "[T]he monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial circum-
stances, make her decision less voluntary." In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 425, 537 A.2d 1227, 
1241 (1988). 
134. To the extent that the possibility of earning such a high fee does cloud the surrogate's 
judgment, it may also prevent her from making an informed decision to become a surrogate. See 
supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
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tary consent by prohibiting fees being paid to a parent in order to in-
duce her to relinquish her child for adoption. 13~ Some courts have held 
that the payment of very small sums in connection with an adoption 
were sufficient to render consent involuntary. 136 Therefore, any fee 
promised a prospective surrogate should be found to unduly influence 
her decision to become a surrogate and sufficient to render her consent 
to the agreement involuntary. 137 
Advance consent in the form of the surrogacy contract is not possi-
ble under the statute for two reasons. First, the statute is plain in re-
quiring that all parties involved in the adoption must appear before the 
court to sign the necessary consent forms. Second, pre-birth consent is 
not contemplated by the statute. Indeed, the statute contemplates that 
the child must be born before consent to adoption may be given. The 
statute requires that "(t]he person adopting a child and the child 
adopted, and the other persons whose consent is necessary, must ap-
pear before the district court" before consent may be given138 and that 
adoption may not take place without the consent of each parent "having 
rights in relation to said child .... " 139 Advance consent is not possible 
under these statutes because parental rights cannot completely vest until 
the child is born. 140 
The requirement that all parties to the adoption give their consent 
to the adoption before a judge is not served by the surrogacy contract. 
The purpose of this requirement is for the judge to satisfy himself that 
135. See the discussion of Utah's baby-selling statute, supra notes 100-07 and accompanying 
text, and the discussion of independent adoptions, supra notes I 08-16 and accompanying text. 
136. Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E.2d (1971)(an offer to pay the mother's 
airfare from Georgia to visit her parents in Illinois was sufficient to render consent involuntary); 
Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957)(consent was rendered involuntary by the 
adoptive parents paying $400 in exchange for the biological parent's consent allowing them to 
adopt two children). 
137. "[A]ny decision ... compelled by a pre-exisiting contractual committment, the threat of 
a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary." In re Baby 
M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988). 
138. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-4 (1953)(emphasis added). 
139. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-4(1)(1981). 
140. "Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent 
and child. They require relationships more enduring." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 
(1983)(quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)). At issue in Lehr was the time 
in which the parental rights of an unwed father may be terminated. The Court determined that an 
unwed father's parental rights do not vest until he "demonstrates a full commitment to the respon-
sibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' .... " /d. at 
361. While it is true that the mother's role in procreation and birth establishes some sort of 
parental relationship between mother and child, id. at n.l6, it seems that the biological link be-
tween mother and child is insufficient to create the full blown parental rights of which the Court 
was speaking. Arguably the mother must also accept "some measure of responsibility for the 
child's future" in order to enjoy full blown parental rights." /d. at 262. 
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the person placing the child for adoption is giving informed and volun-
tary consent to the adoption. If the judge has any doubt that any ele-
ment of consent is not satisfied, he may prevent the parent from forever 
losing her parental rights. The surrogate's parental rights are. clearly 
not protected by the surrogate contract because it attempts to get the 
surrogate to consent to an adoption before the surrogate has the oppor-
tunity to make an informed and voluntary decision. 
The Adoption Law also requires that if written consent of a li-
censed child-placement agency is not obtained upon the filing of the 
adoption petition, that the Division of Family Services shall investigate 
the matter and report its findings to the court. 141 The statute requires 
the Division of Family Services to determine "whether the proposed 
foster parent is financially able and morally fit to have the care, super-
vision, and training of the child"142 and "any other facts and circum-
stances pertaining to the child and his welfare." 143 This "indicate[s] a 
legislative intention to assure that a minor child, in an independent 
adoption, will be placed with fit and proper parents."144 Surrogacy 
contracts violate this policy because little, if any, effort is expended to 
determine the parental fitness of the adopting parent. 1411 Indeed, the 
contract's sole purpose is to provide an infertile couple with a baby; not 
to seek the best interests of the child. 
V. THE UTAH SuRROGATE PARENTHOOD AcT 
The preceding section suggested that surrogacy contracts may al-
ready have been prohibited under Utah's baby-selling, child placement, 
termination, and adoption laws before the legislature voted to enact the 
Surrogate Parenthood Act. These laws, however, did not prohibit sur-
rogacy because the legislature made a conscious policy decision to pre-
clude the practice, rather surrogacy was forbidden indirectly-indeed, 
accidentally-by laws that were promulgated to deal with entirely dif-
141. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-14 (1985). See Matter of S., 572 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977). 
142. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-14(4)(c)(1985). 
143. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-14(4)(e)(1985). 
144. Matter of S., 572 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1977). 
145. The New Jersey Supreme Court said of the Baby M contract, 
Although the interest of the natural father and adoptive mother is certainly the 
predominant interest, realistically the only interest served ... not even a superficial 
attempt is made to determine their awareness of their responsibilities as parents. 
Worst of all, however, is the contract's total disregard of the best interests of the 
child. There is not the slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any time to 
determine the fitness of the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive 
parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the child of not living with 
her natural mother. 
In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988)(emphasis in original). 
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ferent problems. The previous prohibition against surrogacy was not 
specific, therefore, it lacked authoritativeness because surrogacy itself 
was not directly prohibited. The prohibition also failed to define the 
rights of parties involved in surrogate contracts, leaving courts without 
legislative guidance as to how custody disputes should be resolved. 
The Surrogate Parenthood Act, however, changed this. The Act 
explicitly renders both commercial and gratuitous surrogacy unenforce-
able as violative of public policy, provides criminal liability for all per-
sons and organizations involved in commercial surrogacy, 146 and defines 
the status of children born as a result of surrogacy agreements. 147 
In light of the potential problems involved in any surrogacy ar-
rangement the Act was long overdue. The Act is justified, if for no 
other reason, on the ground that it sends a message to all persons con-
templating a surrogate contract that neither commercial nor gratuitous 
146. Violation of the Act is considered a class A misdemeanor. UTAH Cmw ANN. § 76-7-
204( 1 )(d)( 1989). A class A misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of a year or 
less. !d. at§ 76-3-204(1)(1973). 
147. The Act provides: 
( 1 )(a) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may be a party to a contract for 
which consideration is given, and in which a woman agrees to undergo artificial insem-
ination or other procedures and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a child 
born as a result. 
(b) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may facilitate a contract prohibited 
by Subsection (1 ). This section does not apply to medical care provided after 
conception. 
(c) Contracts or agreements entered into in violation of this section are null and void, 
and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 
(2) An agreement which is entered into, without consideration given, in which a wo-
man agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other procedures and subsequently 
terminate her parental rights to a child born as a result, is unenforceable. 
(3)(a) In any case arising under Subsection (1) or (2), the surrogate mother is the 
mother of the child for all legal purposes, and her husban<i, if she is married, is the 
father of the child for all legal purposes. 
(b) In any custody issue that may arise under Subsection (1) or (2), the court is not 
bound by any of the terms of the contract or agreement but shall make its custody 
decision based solely on the best interest of the child. 
( 4) Nothing in this section prohibits adoptions and adoption services that are in ac('()r-
dance with the laws of this state. 
(5) This section applies to contracts or agreements that are entered into after April 24, 
1989, the effective date of this act. 
(6)(a) This section is repealed on July 1, 1991. 
(b) Prior to January 1, 1991, the Legislative Interim Social Services Committee shall 
analyze and assess the current status of surrogacy arrangements and related issues, 
including adoption, paternity, custody, support, visitation, and the termination of pa-
rental rights, and make its recommendations to the Legislature regarding the policy of 
this state and any proposed legislation regulating surrogate parenthood arrangements. 
(b) Any incident or arrangement of surrogate parenthood, as described in Subsection 
(1) or (2) that occurs prior to July I, 1991 is governed by this section. 
UTAH Com: ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989). 
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surrogacy will be enforced in the Beehive State. Those contemplating 
surrogacy have advance notice as to the consequences of a surrogate 
relationship and are not left wondering whether the policy of the state 
permits or forbids the practice. Infertile Utahns wishing to employ a 
surrogate must either find a woman willing to bear the child for free, 
and take the risk that she will breach her agreement, or go out of state 
and take their chances with the laws and policies of other jurisdictions. 
Perhaps one of the most important provisions of the Act, besides 
rendering surrogacy unenforceable, is the presumption that a child born 
to a surrogate is legally the child of the surrogate and her husband. 148 
This provision legitimizes149 a child born as a result of an illegal com-
mercial contract or legal gratuitous contract, and provides further pro-
tection to the child by determining ultimate parental responsibility in 
the event that either party breaches the agreement after the child is 
born. 150 The section does not provide a similar presumption as to the 
child's paternity when the surrogate is unmarried, even though it does 
provide that the child is legally the surrogate's. 151 This may not be a 
significant problem, however, because people seem to prefer that the 
surrogate be married anyway. 152 But to the extent that single surro-
gates are used, this section has the effect of bastardizing the child of a 
single surrogate who decides to keep the child for herself. 153 Whether 
148. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a)(1989). It is interesting to note that Utah has not 
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. Section 5 of that Act provides that a husband will be treated 
as the natural father of a child born to his wife when he has consented to her being artificially 
inseminated with donor sperm. Because surrogates normally conceive by means of artificial insem-
ination, the above cited section of the Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act seems to suggest that a 
married woman, who is artificially inseminated with donor sperm, gives birth to a legitimate child 
whether or not her husband consented to the insemination, and both her and her husband are 
legally the parents of that child. It is questionable whether this is the Utah Legislature's intended 
result. 
149. At common law an illegitimate child had few rights. An illegitimate was not entitled to 
support from her parents nor was she entitled to an inheritance. In addition, she was considered to 
be without heirs, except for those of her own body. Today, however, the status of illegitimate 
children has significantly improved, although an illegitimate child is still not entitled to support or 
an inheritance from her father unless he takes action to legitimize her, or she brings a paternity 
action against him. See generally B.Y.U. J LEGAL STUD., SUMMARY OF UTAH fAMILY LAW§§ 
20.2-20.5 (1980). 
ISO. UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 76-7-204(3)(a)(1989). 
151. /d. 
152. See supra note 24. 
153. This is arguably no different than the status of a child born to an unwed mother. Both 
are illegitimate. However, in the latter case, the putative father can legitimize the child by mar-
rying the child's mother, UTAH ConE ANN.§ 77-60-14 (1978), or by publicly acknowledging the 
child as his own. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-30-12 (1977). If the single surrogate reneges on her 
agreement and keeps her child it is likely that the child will remain illegitimate unless the father is 
willing to publicly acknowledge it as his own. It seems highly unlikely that the father would ever 
be willing to do this, especially in light of the agreement's breach. However, Utah law does permit 
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or not this problem is one that can be resolved is something the legisla-
ture will have the chance to deal with when the Act expires. 154 
It is significant that the Act provides that courts are to ignore the 
terms of the contract and look only to the best interests of the child in 
resolving custody disputes. 11111 This should be self-evident, given the fact 
that the court is making a decision that will affect an innocent child's 
future. However, the trial court's decision in the Baby M case illus-
trates too well that the judge may place more importance on the surro-
gate contract than on the best interests of a child created under the 
contract.156 This provision reflects a policy decision that the best inter-
ests of a child should not be determined by self-interested participants 
to a contract, but rather on the basis of an impartial judicial decision 
made after the child's birth and after reviewing all of the relevant facts 
that could affect that child. 
The biggest problem with the Act is that it is temporary. 157 Be-
cause of this it provides no guidance as to the long term policy of the 
state regarding the practice of surrogacy. This may cause some 
problems for people contemplating surrogate motherhood after the Act's 
repeal and, once again, place the courts in the awkward and difficult 
position of trying to decide what laws apply to this unique arrange-
ment. Before the Act was adopted, a good argument could be made that 
surrogacy was already prohibited by the baby-selling statute as well as 
a combination of the adoption, child placement and termination stat-
utes.158 The current Act plainly supercedes the above combination of 
statutes, because it is specifically designed to prohibit the practice as 
one that is against public policy; therefore, the official attitude of the 
state towards surrogacy is no longer left to inference. However, once 
the Act is repealed, infertile couples will once again be left to infer 
what the policy of the state actually is. 
Because the Act is ambiguous, two inferences are possible. First, 
one could infer that the above mentioned combination of statutes will 
continue to prohibit the practice in the absence of a specific act. This 
may not be a plausible inference, however, because the legislature 
failed to state in the current Act whether it considered surrogacy to be 
baby-selling or something that could otherwise be prohibited by other 
statutes. Second, because the legislature prohibited surrogacy and then 
an illegitimate to bring a paternity action against its putative father and to sue for support. UTAH 
CooE ANN. §§ 78-45a-2 and 78-45a-5 (1977). 
154. See UTAH Com: ANN. § 76-7-204(6)(1989). 
155. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(b)(1989). 
156. See In re Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987). 
157. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-204(6)(1989). For the text see supra note 147. 
158. See supra notes I 00-45 and accompanying text. 
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repealed the prohibition, it is also possible to infer that the practice 
after repeal is legal and not subject to regulation by the previously 
mentioned statutes. The second inference seems to be more sound. 
That the legislature chose to prohibit surrogacy for only two years 
is disappointing. Presumably this will give the Legislative Interim So-
cial Services Committee two additional years1119 to analyze the effect of 
this new Act on surrogacy to determine whether the Act accomplishes 
its objectives and should be retained, whether it should be more strict, 
or whether it should be totally repealed in favor of an act merely regu-
lating surrogacy instead of proscribing it. Arguably, there may be some 
benefits to be gained in having the legislature readdress this issue again 
in 1991. Perhaps by then surrogacy will be a more accepted means of 
helping infertile couples cope with childlessness. However, until such 
time, for the sake of predictability, the law should be on the books in-
definitely and the burden placed on the proponents of surrogacy to 
prove that the practice is in line with sound public policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although this Act is a step in the right direction, it is unfortunate 
that an attempt to give clear definition to the state's existing policy is 
given such a limited duration. Hopefully, the legislature will rectify 
this problem by realizing that the repeal of the Act in 1991 will revert 
the surrogacy laws to a point less certain than they were in 1988 and 
enact long term legislation to prohibit the practice. 160 Such a broad pro-
159. Why the legislature would feel that they need an additional two years to study surro-
gacy is a mystery. In 1988 the House of Representatives established a Surrogate Parenthood Study 
Committee for the purpose of studying the issues surrounding surrogacy for eight months. The 
Committee was composed of qualified representatives from the Department of Health, the De-
partment of Social Services, the Utah Hospital Association, the Utah Medical Association, the 
Attorney General's Office, in addition to senators, representatives, and a medical ethics expert. 
The purpose of the Committee was to (1) consider whether public policy would permit surrogate 
contracts, (2) seek input from medical and ethics experts, as well as religious organizations, (3) 
consider the competency of the courts to adjudicate surrogacy controversies, and ( 4) consider 
whether legislative action is necessary to regulate the practice, and if so, to recommend surrogacy 
legislation. UTAH LEGIS. Rt:P. §§ 63-70-1 and 63-70-2 (1988). 
160. Under the present Act, toleration of gratuitous surrogacy may be justified because fewer 
risks are involved. 
The potential for commodification is avoided, and the potential for exploitation is min-
imized. Because gratuitous surrogacy arrangements usually occur among friends or rel-
atives, the likelihood of breaches is greatly reduced. Accordingly, enforcement problems 
rarely occur. In fact, an understanding between sisters or intimate friends probably is 
not cast in the matrix of a contract at all. 'Philanthropic' surrogacy, then, is virtually 
benign and its suppression advances no weighty state interest. 
Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 152-53. Nevertheless, this fails to take into account 
the risks to the mental health of the surrogate, her family, the adopting couple, and the child. See 
supra notes 94-97. However, since the legislature has expressed an interest in studying surrogacy 
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hibition may be painful for childless couples, however, the risks that 
are attendant in surrogacy place a greater potential for pain on the 
child thus conceived. There should be no question as to which party is 
better able to cope with this sort of psychological pam. 
jason C. DeMille 
further, it should also consider whether it wishes to retain this exception to the law if it continues 
to prohibit surrogacy generally. 
